The future of infection control:Role of the clinical microbiology laboratory by Kolmos, Hans Jørn
Syddansk Universitet
The future of infection control
Kolmos, Hans Jørn
Publication date:
2011
Document Version
Submitted manuscript
Link to publication
Citation for pulished version (APA):
Kolmos, H. J. (2011). The future of infection control: Role of the clinical microbiology laboratory Accessed Oct
19, 2011, from http://www.sykehushygiene.no/?id=fagkonferanse
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 16. jan.. 2017
The future of infection control 
Role of the clinical microbiology laboratory 
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Information extracted from  
clinical samples in the microbiology laboratory 
 
The main object:  
 To identify & characterize  
causative organism of the 
patient’s disease in order to 
target antibiotic treatment 
 
The infection control aspect: 
 Special precautions necessary, 
e.g. to isolate the patient? 
 Same strain is isolated from 
two or more patients: is there 
an outbreak? 
Only fire fighting! 
 – not true infection prevention & control 
The Bergen fire fighters 
Standards & guidelines 
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Care 
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HCAIs 
Yes,.. but 
Standards & guidelines 
cannot prevent all HCAIs 
 
Diagnostics 
Therapy 
Care 
Rehabilitation 
 
HCAIs 
In spite of all precautions, 
we need fire fighters now and then… 
Bergen 2008 
Standards or ”fire fighting” ? 
 Not an either-or  
 Rather, a both-and 
 Interactions between IC &  
microbiol lab become still more 
important, because: 
 Health care changes faster 
and faster 
 New risks emerge 
 More problems with 
resistant bacteria 
Outbreak of hepatitis B  
in a paediatric haematology/oncology ward 
 A patient was incidentally found to be HBV infected 
 The viral strain was identical to a strain isolated from 
another patient one year earlier 
 Screening of 131 patients admitted to the ward over the 
past 16 months identified further six patients infected 
with the outbreak strain 
 All were asymptomatic, presumably because they were 
severely immunocompromised 
 All were HBeAg positive 
Fisker et al. BMJ 2006; 332: 343-5 
How the outbreak was disclosed 
 All eight strains belonged to 
the same genotype 
 The outbreak was disclosed 
only because phylogenetic 
analysis (“genetic 
fingerprinting”) was 
performed on all locally 
circulating HBV strains 
 This was performed as part 
of an ongoing PhD project 
Fisker et al. BMJ 2006; 332: 343-5 
HBV infection was associated to  
central venous catheters and admission days at risk 
HBV pos HBV neg 
 
P 
CVC/total 
(%) 
7/7 
(100%) 
41/124 
(33%) 
0.0007 
Median days at risk 
 (25%ile; 75%ile) 
40 
(17; 74) 
5.5 
(2; 22) 
0.002 
Fisker et al. BMJ 2006; 332: 343-5 
Days with invasive procedures and date of HBV diagnosis  
in the eight infected children 
Fisker et al. BMJ 2006; 332: 343-5 
Field investigations performed by  
the infection control team 
 Ward facilities 
 Clinical procedures: 
 Blood sampling (ward & outpatient clinic) 
 Placement & maintenance of i.v. catheters 
 Intravenous medications & transfusions 
 Disposal of needles and other material 
contaminated with blood & body fluids 
 Only identified breaches in hygiene were in the 
ward medication preparation room 
Fisker et al. BMJ 2006; 332: 343-5 

Interviews with the staff revealed the following: 
 
 Due to lack of space and facilities the ward 
medication preparation room was used routinely for: 
 Collection of blood samples taken at bedstead 
 Drying of bone marrow smears 
 ... and occasionally for: 
 Blood sampling 
 i.v. medications & transfusions 
Fisker et al. BMJ 2006; 332: 343-5 

HBV outbreak: lessons learned 
 The ward medication preparation room is a 
clean room  
 Admitted items:  
 drugs & fluids from pharmacy 
 Sterile supply goods 
 No admittance for items & drugs that have been 
in contact with the patient  
 Critical & correct use of multi-dose vials; must 
be kept under lock or preferably replaced by 
single-dose vials 
Fisker et al. BMJ 2006; 332: 343-5 
Problems solved? 
Trolley used for drug distribution in an oncology unit 
 Pseudo-outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa  
in HIV patients undergoing bronchoscopy 
Kolmos et  al. Scand J Infect Dis 1994; 26: 653-7 
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 Pseudo-outbreak of P.aeruginosa in HIV patients:  
What had gone wrong?  
• Outbreak strain was 
isolated from biopsy port 
of bronchoscope  
• Staff was inexperienced 
with maintenance of 
bronchoscopes  
• Neglected manual 
cleaning of biopsy port 
Kolmos et  al. Scand J Infect Dis 1994;26:653-7 
Se also: Kirsche et al. NEJM 2003;348:214-20 
Pseudo-outbreak of P.aeruginosa in HIV patients:  
The true risk 
Kolmos et  al. Scand J Infect Dis 1994; 26: 653-7 
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Mycobacteria in lavages of patients  
undergoing bronchoscopy over a 12-month period 
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Inspection of bronchoscopes & disinfector 
Lessons learned 
 Importance of physical/mechanical cleansing 
 Shared responsibility = no responsibility 
 Disinfectors 
 Service & maintenance in accordance with standards 
 Clear definitions of responsibilities 
 Log books 
 Audits  
 Who reads the lab reports? 
Andersen & Kolmos. DKCS 2010 
3rd generation cephalosporin resistant  
E. coli in Denmark 2010  
E. coli  
DK 2010 
ESBL/Amp C 
Blood hosp 7 % 
Urine hosp 5 % 
Urine GP 3 % 
DANMAP 2010 
Prevalence of ESBL types in retail meat 
2010 
DANMAP 2009 
Overdevest et al. Emerg Infect Dis 2011;17:1216-22 
ESBL genes of E. coli in  
chicken meat and humans (the Netherlands) 
Overdevest et al. Emerg Infect Dis 2011;17:1216-22 
Multilocus sequence typing patterns of E. coli from  
chicken meat, other meat types, & humans (the Netherlands)  
Problem organisms in hospitals  
with a possible origin in food animals 
Examples:  
 
 ESBL producing E. coli 
 Clostridium difficile 
 VRE  
 H-l genta R E.faecalis 
 MRSA (CC398) 
 
Resistant organisms in hospitals: 
the “One-Health” concept 
E. coli with ESBL: 
Selected with 3rd gen ceph 
Invasive infection  
Acquired through food  
Healthy intestinal carrier 
Low concentration 
Co-selected w tetracyclines 
Healthy intestinal carrier 
High concentration 
Meat contaminated at slaughter 
The clinical microbiology laboratory: 
A help tool for infection control – today and in the future 
 Identifying and characterizing 
organisms causing  HCAIs 
 Antimicrobial resistance 
 Knowledge as a basis for IC 
decision making  
 Detecting breaches in IC 
 non-compliance w guidelines 
 Inadequacy of guidelines 
 Providing new knowledge 
 Unforseen risks 
 Epidemiology of resistance 
 Contribute to surveillance of HCAIs 
What is required, if the clinical microbiology laboratory  
is to play an active role in future infection control? 
The setting: 
 In close contact with clinicians and infection control team  
The human resources: 
 Medically trained staff 
 “Alertness culture” in the lab 
The technical equipment: 
 Rapid and validated methods for identification of organisms 
particularly multi-drug resistant organisms  
 Easy access to typing – focus on molecular methods, e.g.  
    PFGE & DNA-sequencing 
 Lab information system providing data for on-line surveillance 
of HCAIs 
Thank you for your attention! – and 
congratulations on the 40th anniversary 
from your devoted friends in Denmark 
